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Abstract
This report describes the current state of the research performed
as a part of the CyberShip project for its work packages #3 and #4.
Work package #3 defines measures of prevention to cyber-attacks,
which include frameworks for the strategic and tactical understand-
ing of the effects of a cyber attack, and a number of frameworks that
can be used to structure and analyze the existing risk to a cyber attack
in a CyberShip system as defined in work package #2. Work Pack-
age #4 defines measure of reaction to cyber-attacks and is developed
through the use of software-defined networks (SDN) on a simplified
Cybership systems to reflect the potential of using such a technology
on a complete CyberShip system. This reports provides a theoretical
and methodological foundation to be applied in the development of
case studies, subject of work package #5.
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1 Introduction
The CyberShip project, "Cyber resilience for the shipping industry", is a
project financed by the Danish Maritime Fund (DMF), for 27 months from
September 2017 to November 2019, and is is aimed at proposing a theo-
retical framework to aid the decision making process for preventing and
reacting to cyber-attacks in the shipping industry. The unit of analysis is
a CyberShip system, this is, a ship operation composed of elements con-
nected through Information and Communication Technologies (ICT).
This project is divided into six work packages that are developed se-
quentially. These work packages are:
• Work Package 1 (WP1): Project Management, to coordinate technical
activities and assure quality of results
• Work Package 2 (WP2): Definition of Cyber Resilience KPIs, to define
a specific CyberShip model and cyber resilience key performance in-
dicators (KPIs)
• Work Package 3 (WP3): Cyber attack prevention measures, to define
measures and tools at a strategic (design) level
• Work Package 4 (WP4): Cyber attack response and recovery mea-
sures, to define measures and tools once and if the cyber attack oc-
curs
• Work Package 5 (WP5): Evaluation and application to specific case
studies, to define and evaluate the case studies, and to propose rec-
ommendations for the shipping industry and regulators
• Work Package 6 (WP6): Dissemination, to link colleagues and stake-
holders with the project and its findings and proposals.
Currently, the project is developing Work Packages 3 and 4. These
work packages build up on the results obtained in Work Package 2, re-
sults that are available in a report available publicly at the research site of
the project in the Orbit Database of the Technical University if Denmark
[14] .
The foundation for this report is therefore Work Package #2 (WP2). The
second work package of the CyberShip project had two main objectives.
First, it defined a generic cyber ship model through the identification of all
systems, cyber components, and their communication requirements in a
modern commercial ship. The resulting model defined what is understood
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as the "attack surface" of the ship. As such, a ship is seen as a system
composed of several sub-systems that have individual and independent
characteristics.
Such a CyberShip model thus consist of all systems and cyber com-
ponents in a ship, their capabilities for computation and interaction with
the environment, and the interactions between components in a modern
ship. Second, WP2 defined a set of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) to
measure the degree of cyber resilience performance of any ship system un-
der investigation. These KPIs are qualitative and quantitative measures of
the ship system’s resilience towards cyber attacks. These indicators come
from areas such as risk of cyber attacks, degree of resource redundancy,
response and recovery times, and implementation costs.
This paper therefore describes the prevention and the recovery mea-
sures that are proposed as a result of the research in the CyberShip project.
These are described in detail, and examples of their application are given.
The contributions of this paper are:
• The proposal of prevention measures for the case of CyberShip sys-
tems. This proposal is developed from an analysis of the Cybership
structure and the relationships that exist between these structures,
particularly related to the way in which these relationships can lead
to disruptions in the expected operation of the system.
• The proposal of recovery measures for the case of CyberShip sys-
tems. This proposal is developed from an analysis of a simplified
Cybership structure and the use of Software-defined networking to
detect cyber attacks and trigger appropriate procedures when an at-
tack is likely.
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2 Related Work
The widespread adoption of ICT throughout today’s ships has led re-
searchers to focus on security properties of ship to understand, for exam-
ple, how security breaches within ship’s technologies will result in a vari-
ety of harmful impacts on ship operation and its crew members. However,
the research into ship security is in its early stage and much work focus on
identifying potential threats and vulnerabilities [8, 9, 7]. All these reports
highlights the risks resulting from the use of ICT to critical systems on
the ship. In particular, BIMCO guidelines ( draw special attention to the
different types of cyber attacks affecting the ships and exploiting the vul-
nerabilities in the critical components [9]. These are basically management
guidelines on how to approach the cyber-security issue in the context of
shipping that can be used as an input for the cyber risk assessment. As-
sessment of the vulnerabilities in the control system of the ship is done
in [16]. It examines the importance of critical infrastructure on shipboard
system. Moreover, it established threats and vulnerabilities with the aim
of developing countermeasures to protect the system.
To the best of our knowledge, there are very few works dealing with
the protection of the communication infrastructure of the ship from cyber
attacks. Babineau et.al. [13] proposed to periodically diverting the traffic
between different switches in the network to protect the critical compo-
nents of the ship from cyber attacks.
It relies on the redundancy in the design of the ship’s communication
network to divert the traffic through different paths while forwarding it
to the destination. ABB a leading company in industrial automation pro-
posed to place the critical components of the ship in the core of the net-
work that typically requires firewalls to enter from outside [2].
Yunfei et.al. [43] and Chen et.al [42] proposed architectural solutions to
protect the warship system from cyber attacks. Their mechanisms rely on
statically deployed access controls, firewall and intrusion detection system
(IDS) in the network to mitigate the attacks.
Moreover, Penera et.al. [35] identifies the packet scheduling attack on
the shipboard network controlled system for mitigation. However, it fails
to explain how switches can be configured in an automated way to miti-
gate the attacks dynamically.
Our work aims at proposing a framework to mitigate the attacks in an
automated way to improve the resilience of the ship control system.
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3 The prevention of cyber-attacks in the Cyber-
Ship Model
The first section of this report is related to Work Package #3, and it has to
do with the prevention of cyber-attacks for the case of a CyberShip. This
section of the report is divided into three parts, representing three levels
in which prevention of cyber-risks has been studied in this research.
A first level is strategic-managerial. This is an analysis of the current
frameworks found in literature for the management of cyber-risks in sup-
ply operations and the derivation of a proposed encompassing framework
for cyber attack prevention based on the consequences of such an attack.
This framework is presented by using an analogy of a seismic or flood
wave.
A second level of analysis is tactical, through the analysis of differ-
ent risk evaluation frameworks and their applicability to the analysis of a
CyberShip system. For this analysis, four different risk evaluation frame-
works are presented.
The third level of analysis is operational. In this level of analysis, the
detection phase of the Software-Defined Network (SDN) framework as a
way to actively monitor the traffic of information to detect suspicious or
fraudulent traffic. This research thus presents a real-time tool to reduce
the likelihood of cyber-attacks.
3.1 Strategic Managerial - Prevention framework
Cyber risk management is a relatively novel field with only few frame-
works available that have been specifically adapted and/or validated for
the management of this kind of risks in CyberShip operations.
This part of the report contributes to closing this gap by proposing
a framework derived from existing literature on cyber-risks. Initially, a
structured literature review reveals the approaches used to manage the
risks associated to the use of information and communication technologies
(ICT). These approaches are categorized and a framework is proposed to
give a structure to this categorization.
We followed the structured literature review (SLR) as proposed by Du-
rach et al. [20], details of which can be found in the appendix of this report.
As a result of this SLR analysis, recurrent themes are identified during
the literature review process. These themes are knowledge areas under
which the paper contents can be clustered. This process of theme identifi-
cation and categorization results in a list of twelve knowledge areas in the
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field of supply chain cyber risk management according to the times these
were found in the papers that were analyzed. Each of these categories is
listed with a brief description to the concepts it contains, and with some
reference examples of the papers that refer to these concepts. For a full list
of the papers, please refer to the Appendix.
1. Compliance: In the context of supply chain cyber risk management,
risk compliance is understood as the identifying of the legislation
affecting this area and the standards that must be met, and meeting
these regulations and standards [4].
2. Situational Awareness: It involves the identification of potential cy-
ber threats, vulnerabilities and risks associated to the supply chain,
as well as the ability to assess the probability and impacts of occur-
rence of potential cyber risk events.
3. Governance: IT governance defines who, where and how decisions
affecting IT are made [7]. Moreover, it can be used to provide ade-
quate authority to cyber security to affect decisions in other manage-
rial areas which have an impact on or are impacted by cyber risks.
4. Pre-Event Knowledge Management: it is understood as making the
best use of the knowledge available to achieve organizational objec-
tives. Supply chain resilience can be improved by cultivating knowl-
edge management in a situation previous to a risk-event, due to
bringing a better general understanding of the supply chain and the
human resources [6]. In this regard, the practices recommended are
related to education and training with respect to cyber risks, and the
creation of a resilience/risk management culture.
5. Cyber-Security: it refers to the protection of the assets and systems
(physical or digital) involved with the storing and processing of in-
formation in digital format. Once the risks have been identified and
assessed, then countermeasures must be put in place. Proactive mea-
sures and techniques used to prevent previously identified cyber
risks, before the risk event takes place. In general, information secu-
rity measures tend to focus on the protection of the confidentiality,
integrity and availability of information [8].
6. Visibility: refers to generating knowledge and awareness on the cur-
rent status of supply chain operating assets and the environment
[6],[9]. It involves being able to detect risk events on the supply chain
(i.e. affecting supply chain partners) which also have the potential of
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impacting the focal company. Finding issues as soon in the lifecycle
as possible provide for time and better availability of resources to
deal with them.
7. Velocity: supply chain velocity is defined as "distance over time"
[10], referring to how rapidly the supply chain reacts to disruptive
events.
8. Ability to Adapt: The ability to adapt can be understood as being
able to manage critical resources and operations in the supply chain
and adjust them in response to challenges and opportunities [6],[9].
This ability is also covered in the supply chain resilience literature
through two elements: flexibility and redundancy [6]. In this case,
flexibility refers to flexibly use of processes, supply and/or demand
management. Redundancy, on the other hand, builds on maintain-
ing excess capacity as a mechanism to adapt to disruptive events [6].
9. Recovery Management: it involves the identification of critical vul-
nerabilities and risks that the firm should prepare for, the develop-
ment of contingency plans for recovery and mission assurance after
a risk event, planning for the availability of resources needed for the
execution of post-disruption plans, and the effective and efficient ex-
ecution of those plans when needed [6].
10. Market Position and Financial Strength: In the context of supply
chain resilience, market position refers to the status of an organiza-
tion and/or its products in specific markets, while financial strength
reflects its capacity to absorb variations in cash flow [9]. Both con-
cepts are instrumental in increasing a firm’s chance of recovering
from supply chain disruptions [6]. This way, market share, prod-
uct differentiation and customer loyalty are some sub-factors under-
stood to form part of the market position, while financial reserves,
liquidity, portfolio diversification and insurance are elements under
the broader concept of financial strength [9].
11. Post-Event Knowledge Management: Post-event knowledge man-
agement focuses on enhancing the ability of the supply chain to learn
from past events, through elements like post-event feedback, im-
provement through education and training, and gathering of cost/ben-
efit knowledge [6], which can be used for updating contingency plans
and innovating by improving or changing resilience mechanisms
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[11]. Some elements proposed for pre-event knowledge manage-
ment are also useful in post-event knowledge management, like ed-
ucation and training about information security, and the embedded-
ness of key learnings in the organizational security culture.
12. Social Capital: Social capital involves the network of relationships
formed with suppliers, which can also be seen as a valuable asset,
and an enduring source of advantage. Social capital contains "the
information, trust and norms of reciprocity inhering within social
networks" and is linked to the resilient concepts of absorbing shock
and adapting to change [12], as well as a strengthened ability among
the supply chain partners to learn from each other [6].
3.1.1 A structure for the effects of cyber-attacks
A dynamic approach is followed to classify the themes described in the
previous section. A dynamic approach as one that considers time as the
main variable of study. In the case of a cyber-attack, the occurrence of a
hypothetical event related to a cyber-attack is taken as the point of refer-
ence in time, and themes found in literature are clustered and presented as
belonging to a moment in time that can be 1) before, 2) during or 3) after
(post) the realization of this hypothetical event. A representation of this
perspective can be seen in figure 1.
Figure 1: A dynamic representation of a cyber-attack
In published literature, other authors have used similar approaches,
especially in the area of supply chain resilience. For example, Herrera
& Janczewski [11] and Ali et al. [6] present frameworks where the dif-
ferent themes belong to one of the three stages in a disruption event: pre-
disruption, during-disruption and post-disruption. Additionally, their po-
sitions differ in relation to how far they are from the moment in time in
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which a risk event occurs, and whether they take place before or after a
risk event.
This proposed dynamic approach positions all the identified themes in
a sort of timeline, position related to how each element interacts in time,
both 1) with the prevention of, response to, and recovery from cyber risk
events, as well as with their 2) short, medium or long-term effects. As a
result, the main elements from section III are represented on a timeline as
shown in figure 2.
Figure 2: Main themes on the timeline framework
The order of the elements shown in the timeline is derived from litera-
ture, as it has been argued that Compliance can be regarded as the precedent
for the management of cyber risks, where the risks and security standards
to conform to exert influence into the risk assessment process [4], which
forms part of Situational Awareness. Good situation awareness in the con-
text of supply chain resilience leads to the understanding of the vulnera-
bilities of the supply chain and the planning for risk events, allowing for
the elaboration of early warning strategies or continuity planning and the
identification of supporting elements needed for them, like information
sharing, coordination, and the availability of knowledge [6]. Therefore, it
is understood that situation awareness is also needed early in the process
of Supply Chain Cyber Risk Management (SCCRM).
Governance, on the other hand, feeds on the outcomes from Compliance
and Situation awareness [4], defining how IT-related decisions should be
made across the organization and the supply chain to manage cyber risks.
Subsequently, the previous elements define what knowledge should be
created and nurtured among the members of the organization and the
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supply chain when it comes to managing cyber risks, which is achieved
through proper Knowledge Management prior to the realization of the
risk event [6].
Cyber Security mechanisms must be in place to prevent the exploita-
tion of vulnerabilities from adversaries and to protect the goals of the sup-
ply chain from incoming threats [13]. However, if the security in place is
not enough to stop the cyber-threat, then enough supply chain Visibility
is needed to ensure that a cyber-attack is discovered before it has caused
significant damage [9].
If the cyber event is spotted, then Velocity mechanisms are needed to
allow for a fast response [10]. In the chaos of a disruption, the Ability to
Adapt is instrumental to allow continuity of operations, through for exam-
ple a flexible redistribution of resources through different processes and
the use of previously redundant capacity [6].
The existence of Recovery Management programs helps in prioritizing
the resources and coordinated actions needed throughout the supply chain
to recover from a cyber-disruption, by providing valid contingency plans
and ensuring the availability of resources needed to return the enterprise
to the normal state [14]. If it turns out that there are no contingencies
available, or these are inadequate, then the company will rely solely on
absorbing the damage through its Market Position and Financial Strength
[9].
As operations recovers from the disruption, it is important to use the
very valuable learnings gained through the experience to update and im-
prove the practices across the different SCCRM mechanisms previously
described, through proper Post-Event Knowledge Management [6].
Finally, the Social Capital that is formed in turbulent times is also a valu-
able asset, that can enhance collaborative attitudes across different levels
in the supply chain, towards a better management of the common risks
faced and the exploitation of new opportunities [12].
This sense of distance in time allows for alternate approaches to the
problem of managing cyber risks in the supply chain, through the intro-
duction of concepts like strategic and tactical elements, as depicted in fig-
ure 3.
Strategic elements, understood as those elements that look at the prob-
lem from a more long-term point of view, and tactical mechanisms as those
that approach it from a shorter time span, then this division allows to iden-
tify mechanisms that are more relevant in either the short (tactical) or the
long (strategical) term, before and/or after the realization of a risk event,
and how they can complement each other in a supply chain cyber-risk
management plan.
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Figure 3: Strategic and Tactical view of the timeline framework
3.1.2 Wave analogy for cyber risk effects
The themes found in literature and their places in the timeline as pro-
posed by the framework in the previous section, can be better understood
through the use of an analogy, which considers the ripple or wave created
by an impact against a surface (e.g. like ripples on the water, or the seismic
waves after an earthquake).
As part of this analogy, the timeline represents the perspective of a focal
organization, which forms part of a supply chain. The point of reference
is the "point of impact" in which a cyber-event "hits" the organization, as
in figure 4.
Figure 4: Point of impact for the timeline framework
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From an analysis using this framework, for a risk to successfully im-
pact the organization, it must cut across a number of defensive mecha-
nisms on the left side, located either far in time (strategic mechanisms) or
close (tactic/operational mechanisms). These can also be understood as
lines of defense.
When the lines of defense are not able to stop a cyber-event, an impact
takes place. This impact then creates a "shock wave", or a "ripple", that can
expand in time as shown in figure 5. The magnitude of those waves and
their reach will depend on a number of factors.
On the left side of the framework, there are the elements that can re-
duce the strength of (or even stop) the impact (i.e., in this analogy the
speed at which the cyber-bullet impacts the system), which will directly
affect the magnitude of the shock wave on impact. However, the function
of the elements placed on the right side of the framework is to mitigate the
"disastrous" effects of those waves by absorbing them.
For the sake of this analogy, it can be understood that these waves are
able to reach as far as the next absorption mechanism in place is able to
absorb a shock wave of equal or bigger magnitude. If a wave is stronger
than what a certain mechanism can absorb, then its effects will continue
to spread and the next mechanism in time will have to actuate, until the
shock wave is stopped.
Figure 5: Defenses and ripple effects of a cyber-attack with the time line
framework
As an example of the time line use, consider the the left side of the time
line from the time of the risk event. It could be the case that the regulatory
requirements (Compliance) are not enough to adequately address a certain
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cyber-threat. If this threat is not made aware of as part of the risk iden-
tification and assessment process, then different governing processes and
structures may not be in place to correctly address them, and the knowl-
edge management (KM) needed to treat it will not be there either.
It could also happen that this cyber-attacker, making use of an inher-
ent vulnerability in the system, is able to avoid the cyber security in place.
Then, if the Visibility mechanisms are not designed to detect the actions of
a cyber-attack whose possibility had not been identified before, the orga-
nization might have been hit by a cyber-event without (maybe) being able
to notice it.
For example, if a cyber-breach occurs and the Visibility and Velocity
mechanisms in place are not able to detect and react to the attack fast
enough, then Adaptive mechanisms could also be not enough to contain and
stop it from spreading and/or allowing the attackers to access the IT sys-
tems of the organization. If such a breach escalates, then the organization
starts relying on the existence of contingency plans to recover from the dis-
ruption, together with facing a test on its financial and market strength. If
an organization is not able to stop this "wave", then the "disaster" could
become comparable to that of a "cyber-tsunami", in which the continuity
of the company’s mission is at stake.
Even though the effects of a cyber-tsunami (figure 6) are not the same
as an actual tsunami, since an organization’s physical assets might still be
there for some more time, their business model could have been affected
critically, due to financial unsustainability as a consequence of, for exam-
ple, loss of competitive advantage (e.g., from IP theft), reputation loss,
increased costs or the technical impossibility of continuing critical opera-
tions within a reasonable time frame.
In such a condition, the only things left for the organization might be
Social Capital such as the personal and collective knowledge contained in
the organization or the value of the network of personal relations formed
within the value chain, and learning from past experiences (Post-Event
KM), which could be used to innovate and build a new start for the or-
ganization after the risk event.
3.2 Tactical - Risk analysis frameworks
All risk analysis methods to some extent relate to a more generic process
of identifying, quantifying and reducing risk and traditional approaches
have followed the “analytic reduction” method of separating a problem
into smaller sub-units, understanding the behaviour of each unit sepa-
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Figure 6: Cyber-tsunami wave analogy with the timeline framework
rately and then integrating this understanding into an understanding of
the whole.
Traditional notions of risk consider it to be the probability of failure of
a system, as derived from two characteristics of the system, the probability
of occurrence of a specific mode of failure that leads to an unwanted event,
and the consequence or severity of the failure mode materializing. These
ways in which the mode of failure can materialize have been identified
normally through methods such as fault tree analysis, event tree analy-
sis, the HAZard and OPerability analysis (HAZOP), and the Failure Mode
and Effects Analysis (FMEA). These methods link a cause with an unde-
sirable effect, but “are unable to include aspects such as design errors, such
as software flaws, component interaction accidents, cognitively complex human
decision-making errors, and social, organizational and management factors con-
tributing to an unwanted event” [28]. In order to address this gap, this work
considers the following risk analysis frameworks:
• Systems Theoretic Process Analysis
• Attack fault tree
• Attack defense tree, and
• Priced-timed automata
3.2.1 STPA - Systems theoretic process analysis
This is a model based on systems theory rather than traditional analytic
reduction and reliability theory. A safe operation is seen as an emergent
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property resulting from the interactions between the system components
and with the environment. The problem of avoiding “accidents” (i.e., un-
planned loss events) thus becomes a dynamic control problem of limiting
the ways in which the system can behave. Figure 7 is a representation of a
generic controlled process.
Figure 7: Basic control system
This representation includes a controlled process that converts inputs
to outputs, sensors that convert the state of the system into a signal that is
understood by a controller, which then triggers some type of actuator to
influence the controlled process. In this way a circular loop of control is
formed, which allows for continuous monitoring and adjustment of a process.
Representing cyber risks through a control system is not trivial, since
from this perspective cyber-attacks are not events that happen from ex-
ternal sources, but rather events which systems such as CyberShip are
“mis-designed” to experience. In this context, risky cyber-events are an
unintended consequence that results from incomplete requirements at the
time of system design. A systemic analysis seeks to identify this “un-
requested” design that creates cyber-vulnerability, and determine design
changes through which a cyber-vulnerable behavior is less likely to occur
or no longer possible.
Extensive literature has been published about the description of the
STAMP methodology framework (Estefan, 2007; Leveson, 2011; Salmon
et al., 2012; Altabbakh et al., 2013), with examples of application in dif-
ferent industries, such as medical (Antoine,2013), environmental (Hardy
et al., 2011), robotics (Mitka et al., 2015), power production (Karami et
Page 16
CyberShip Project: Work Package 3 & 4 Report
v.181107
al., 2015), software development (Wang et al., 2016), and defense (Chiesi,
2016). However, no application has been documented for CyberShip sys-
tems.
The systems theoretic process analysis (STPA) application is outlined
in figure 8.
Figure 8: Systems theoretic process analysis sequence
The proposed analysis is an adaptation of the analysis proposed by
Leveson [28], and can be separated into five main steps:
1. System identification and description. System goals have to be de-
scribed, and the boundaries of the system have to be explicitly de-
fined, members of the system (controllers), the information flows
that occur between these controllers, accumulation of information
that may happen along the process, and the existing control loops in
the present state of the system.
2. Boundary identifications in three domains: Unacceptable losses and
accidents, hazards, and control actions. The unacceptable losses or
accidents (A) should reflect undesirable or unplanned events which
derive in the loss of a system mission, defined in the previous step,
and should include any relevant dimension such loss or damage of
property, loss of human life or environmental pollution, for exam-
ple. In the case of a buyer-seller system, unacceptable losses could
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include late or wrong deliveries, for example. The hazards (H) are all
those states of the systems or sets of conditions that combined with
a worst case scenario can end up causing one of the defined A.
3. Unsafe control action (UCA) identification (all those CAs that lead to
a H as identified in Step 2, through the use of a structured scenario
analysis, and in the form of a descriptive phrase. Leveson [28] and
her team identified four main ways in which a CA can lead to H.
(a) CA is performed and this leads to H,
(b) CA is not performed, and this leads to H,
(c) CA is performed to early or too late,
(d) CA is performed too long for too short a time, and this creates
H.
4. Identify the UCAs from Step 3 that can be enabled by cyber-attacks.
5. Translate the contexts into requirements













Figure 9: STPA representation of a CyberShip system
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4 The reaction to cyber-attacks in the CyberShip
Model
In this section, we propose our CyberShip framework to mitigate the at-
tacks in an automated way in the ship communication network. The major
components are shown in Fig. 10, while the details are given below:
4.1 Components of the Framework
Figure 10: CyberShip Framework
In this section, we describe the components of our framework. It con-
sists of five different cyber physical components as follows:
1. Sensors andActuators: Sensors and actuators are attached to the dif-
ferent physical components of the ship related to the bridge, engine
and propulsion control devices. These sensors forward the data re-
lated to these physical devices to Integrated Bridge Controller and the
Autonomous Engine Monitoring Controller for analysis.
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2. SDN Controller: It is a software platform deployed in external en-
tity able to provide the network abstractions needed to manage the
network [8]. It provides centralized intelligence and global visibil-
ity to manage the network. Southbound API in the SDN controller
enables us to deploy the rules in the switches through a centralized
location based on the need when it arises.
3. Detection Engine: It examines the network traffic to identify suspi-
cious and malicious activities. Network operators can deploy mech-
anisms to classify the suspicious and malicious flows according to
their requirements [31]. Upon detection of the suspicious or mali-
cious traffic, it reports a security alert to the mitigation engine.
4. Mitigation Engine: It is responsible to take appropriate countermea-
sures to mitigate the attacks in the framework. It contains a reposi-
tory consisting of security and network policies defined in high-level
language to mitigate the attacks. Depending on the security alert,
countermeasure policy is instantiated to mitigate the suspicious or
malicious traffic. Furthermore, it maintains a list of network paths to
reach the different middleboxes (firewalls, IDS, etc.) or to reroute the
traffic through different path.
5. Autonomous Engine Monitoring Controller (AEMC): It manages
the propulsion control, main engine, propeller devices of the ship [5].
Depending on the scenario, it issues the control command to start or
stop the propulsion system, increase or decrease the speed of the
ship, reroute the ship through different routes. Moreover, it period-
ically analyses the data received from the sensors of the propulsion,
propeller and other components of the engine to check the status of
the devices, i.e. whether they are working properly or not.
6. Integrated Bridge Controller (IBC): It supervises the functioning of
the different bridge components of the ship such as a GNSS, ECDIS,
radar, and AIS [9]. It receives the data from the sensors of these de-
vices and provide a centralized interface to the crew on-board to
access the data. Moreover, it also issues control commands to the
AEMC to start/stop the propulsion control system, reroute the ship
to different routes depending on the information from the bridge de-
vices. In case, it detects the fault or failure on the bridge devices, it
notifies the Mitigation engine to divert the network traffic through
another route to start the auxiliary bridge devices.
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4.2 Use Case
Figure 11: Application of the framework Framework
This section presents a use case exemplifying how the framework en-
ables us to achieve the resiliency by mitigating the attack traffic.
We focus on a scenario of mitigating the impact of the DDoS attack
targeting the AEMC and congesting the network.
The scenario consists of an attacker denoted as A, IBC and AEMC as
shown in Fig. 11.
Moreover, Mitigation and Detection engine are deployed on a separate
controller denoted as C1 and C2 respectively.
Controller C1 is connected through the switch S1 and manages all the
switches in the network except the switch S4.
Controller C2 and AEMC are connected through the switch S4. In the
scenario, Detection Engine is deployed close to the AEMC, as the detection
can be performed effectively close to the system under protection.
In this use case, we assume that the detection is performed based on
the threshold set for packet arrival rate, average of bytes per flow, average
of duration per flow.
IBC sends the messages to the AEMC either to increase or decrease the
speed or to reroute the ship through different waypoints.
Attacker (A) shown in the scenario which is a compromised machine
in the ship communication network, launch the UDP flood traffic towards
Page 22
CyberShip Project: Work Package 3 & 4 Report
v.181107
the AEMC to flood the system and network with bogus packets, so that
the AEMC can not receive the messages from the IBC.
A firewall (FW) is deployed at the switch S5 to process the suspicious
and malicious traffic.
Upon detecting an attack, Detection engine sends an alert message to the
Mitigation engine deployed at the controller C1.
It sends an alert in the IDMEF [22] format for processing the UDP flood
traffic. After receiving the alert, Mitigation engine extracts the information
from the alert message.
Extracted alert information are: source IP of attacker (10.0.0.1), desti-
nation IP of AEMC (10.0.0.3), event type (UDP Flood), flow class which is
”malicious”.
Depending on the event type (UDP Flood) and conditions: flow class
(malicious) it gets the high-level action as a ”Redirect_Firewall” from its
policy in the mitigation engine.
Mitigation engine also maintains the information about the different
paths along with the middlebox deployment location in the network to
divert the flow. The high-level action "Redirect_Firewall" along with flow
information are used by the mitigation engine to configure the rules in the
switch S1 to redirect the flow towards the firewall.
To configure the rule, Mitigation engine modifies the output port infor-
mation for the concerned flow in the switch S1. After redirection of the
attack traffic from machine ’A’, IBC gets the fair share of the bandwidth in
the path containing switches S2 and S3.
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5 Discussion
The design description and use case presented in section 4 demonstrates
that this architecture enables a dynamic and automated mitigation of at-
tacks in the ship’s communication network. Multi-path routing approach
in the framework provides failover in case of link failure or congestion.
Thanks to the global visibility of the network achieved through the SDN
controller, flow details and low-level actions can be quickly modified for
the concerned flow.
The high-level policy language and translation mechanism in the frame-
work reduces the burden on the crew member to enforce the low-level
rules manually. Moreover, it is not required to learn the device specific
syntax to express the policies, since our high-level policy language offers
to express the policies in human understandable language.
Furthermore, the framework promotes the collaboration between the
controllers managing different network devices and the critical compo-
nents of the ship. For instance, in case of a fault in the engine system,
AEMC can request mitigation engine to divert the traffic through different
path to reach the secondary engine. Moreover, the Detection engine in the
framework is responsible to detect cyber attacks at the network layer. This
reduces the burden on the controllers managing the ship system as they
are responsible to manage and control only bridge and engine system.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
This report lays out the measures and tools proposed through this research
project to prevent and recover from cyber events, for the case of a Cyber-
Ship system.
The next step in the process is to apply these tools to cases from the
shipping industry, as considered in the Work Package#5 of the CyberShip
project.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Structured literature review (SLR)
A systematic literature review is a special type of literature review that uses an
explicit method and comprehensive strategy that has been defined before the re-
view takes place.
8.1.1 Advantages of a SLR
The relevance of a systematic approach to literature reviews is reflected in the
structure and social significance of its final results, with implications for explicit-
ness, transparency, comprehensiveness, trustworthiness, relevance, and synthesis
of the results.
First, a systematic approach makes an explicit description of the protocols
used before the actual data collection starts. This helps to reflect and reduce
hidden bias in the data collection process. The philosophical position of the re-
search determines if and to what extent the researcher is a subjective or objective
part throughout the research process. Greater bias is expected for a subjective
researcher position, and less so if the researcher position is more objective. Yet,
regardless of the level of accepted bias in the research process, an explicit descrip-
tion of the process creates greater transparency and improves reproducibility and
comparability.
Second, through the use of explicit protocols, a systematic approach creates
transparency about how the analysis is carried out and how the conclusions are
generated. This reduces the misrepresentation of the available knowledge col-
lected for the review, promotes critique that is more focused, and results in more
efficient improvement of any future SLR process.
Third, a systematic approach attempts to gather as much of the available re-
search as possible by reducing the excessive influence of studies that are simply
easier to find through the use of inclusion criteria. Inclusion criteria describe the
way in which to assess how much each study addresses the research question. A
systematic review does not need to be exhaustive as some reviews only attempt
to gather representative examples of evidence to answer the research question.
These types of reviews benefit nonetheless from being explicit in their criteria.
Fourth, a systematic approach to a literature review indicates to the reader
how much the conclusions reached by the review can be trusted, i.e., its valid-
ity. Science is not only the advancement of the contents of the available body of
knowledge but also the process of its diffusion and acceptance by relevant com-
munities (Resttvo, 1988). This makes trust on the results reached by systematic
reviews a fundamental part of the research process objectives.
Fifth, as a way of increasing the acceptance of the findings, a systematic ap-
proach should include information from relevant communities of interest to the
research question.
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Finally, a systematic approach presents a synthesis of the results in the form
of a structured narrative, summary tables and some type of meta-analysis such
as statistical indicators. This analysis then drives recommendations intended to
connect the findings from the information that was gathered and the conclusions
derived by the researcher.
8.1.2 Methodology for the SLR
Durach et al. [20] propose a structured literature review (SLR) for the field of
supply chain management composed of six steps:
1. defining of the research question,
2. determining of the required characteristics of primary studies,
3. retrieving baseline sample,
4. selecting the pertinent literature from the sample,
5. synthesizing the literature, and
6. reporting and using the results.
The research question is defined as “How should the risks derived from the
use of IT systems be managed along the supply chain?”. After the inclusion and
exclusion criteria are determined, a baseline sample is retrieved by using different
search queries that contain combinations of the keywords supply chain, informa-
tion technology, cyber, security, risk, management and resilience. Those search
queries are used in the databases Scopus and DTU Findit, publications that meet
the inclusion and exclusion criteria. The results shown in this study are drawn
from 123 of those publications.
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